Contrato de Arriendo Taxi

Principio de primacía de la realidad

El derecho laboral tiene como sustento básico y fundamental el compromiso con la verdad real, en atención a la naturaleza de orden público de sus normas.

En esta búsqueda se rige por principios generales del derecho, cuya función es la de consolidar su identidad y autonomía,  así como orientar al intérprete en el momento de juzgar.

En ese sentido, el principio de primacía de la realidad obliga al que juzga a tener en cuenta todas las circunstancias del caso a la hora de valorar, aún por sobre las formas adoptadas contractualmente. Lo obliga a indagar sobre la verdad real, incluso más allá de las pruebas documentales que puedan haberse presentado.

Se enmarca en una serie de otros principios laborales entre los que se destacan: el protectorio, el de irrenunciabilidad de derechos, el de continuidad de la relación laboral, el de razonabilidad,  y los principios de buena fe, equidad, no discriminación y justicia social.

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE PRIMACY OF REALITY IN THE RELATIONS OF THE

PUBLIC SERVICE

The premise on the primacy of the reality of work relations. The primacy of relations in socially constructing organizational realitiesH. Peter Dachler and Dian-Marie HoskingIn: Hosking, D. M., Dachler, H.P., & Gergen, K.J., eds.1995. Management and Organisation: Relational Perspectives. Ashgate/Avebury.

 A long history is attached to the view that socially constructed and that knowledge is in some sense relational. This position has been discussed, and in varying degrees adopted, in areas of philosophy, sociology and psychology, and is most obviously at the forefront of theoretical traditions such as symbolic interactionism, cognitive sociology, phenomenological sociology, and system theory (e.g. McCall & Simmons, 1978; Cicourel, 1974; Schutz, 1962; Mead. 1934; Berger & Luckman 1966; Garfinkel 1967; von Glaserfeld 1985; Watzawick, Weakland & Fish,1974).

 A relational view has gone 1argely unconsidered in the literatures of management and organization. These literatures are dominated by a perspective that variously has been characterised as ‘entitative’ (e.g., Hosking & Morley, 1991), as ‘possessive individualism’ (Sampson, 1988) or as ‘realist ontology’ (e.g. Dachler, 1988). The term ‘relational’ means many different things to writers working from different theoretical traditions and practical concerns. In this chapter we work towards an explicit and systematic statement of the central features that need to be addressed in a relational position.

In our view the key issue in any relational approach lies not in matters of content, e.g. competitive vs collaborative relationships, and not in justifying the truth value of propositional statements; the central issue is epistemological. By epistemological we mean to address the following assumptions: the processes by which we come to ask particular questions in the first place (and not others); the processes by which we come to know, and the processes by which we justify claims to reality. What is experienced as real or true depends on (usually implicitly) held assumptions about processes of knowing. In debates about the reality of different knowledge contents many misunderstandings are a result of unreflected taken for granteds with respect to the underlying epistemology.

It is on the basis of epistemological processes that individual and social phenomena obtain ontology, that is, are interpreted as real or as having a particular meaning.

Epistemological principles are discussed to varying degrees in different literatures. For this reason we will make a beginning by summarizing and integrating them. We do so in order to suggest what it may mean to talk about relational processes in the social construction of managerial and organizational realities. In the first part of this chapter we will discuss the epistemological assumptions of the prevailing entitative perspective and those of the alternate relational perspective. 

This shows the very different understandings of managerial and organizational realities that follow from incommensurate epistemological assumptions. In the second part we illustrate our arguments by showing how diverse epistemological assumptions result in very different understandings of leadership, networking and negotiation.